



SR Introduction to the Electricity Network: Charging & Regulation CPD Seminar

Sponsored by





Welcome

Michael Rieley
Scottish Renewables





Chair

Dr Simon Gill

University of Strathclyde





From BETTA to EMR



Charging for electricity networks

A Scottish Renewables CPD event

Simon Gill, University of Strathclyde

30th August 2017

simon.gill@strath.ac.uk

Currently
seconded to...



We all want a **Secure Affordable** and **Sustainable** energy system



Energy

Ability to
transport energy

Services to keep
the system
running

Sustainable world

Why charge
for networks?

The theory of
it all

Trends in
Charging

Introducing
the cast:
TNUoS to
CDCM

The future

Regulated Natural Monopolies



Is this Sensible?


Huge fixed costs up capital investment
+
Low marginal operating costs
=
Natural Monopoly

but

Full Monopoly = Complete Market Power

so


Networks are *Regulated*
Natural
Monopoly



What have networks done for us?

For **generators**: networks bring **reliable access to a market**

For **consumers**: networks **facilitate competition** and **provide a secure supply**






What is the value of the wind turbine to the household?
What is the value of the household to the wind turbine operator?

How much do they cost?

Only investors know
how much return is
required

Only the network
companies themselves
really know how much
it costs to build and
operate the network



Setting the allowed revenue

Price controls and RIIO



Negotiation between Regulator and Network Company:
*How much **in total** does it really cost to run my network?*

Network companies must:
Maintain obligatory service standards
Aim to beat jointly agreed performance targets
Innovate to reduce costs

Network companies get to keep some of the difference if they deliver at lower cost.



2015

RIIO- ED 1

2023

Network companies regulated on
TOTEX

What drives network cost?





Energy Drawn from the
grid in 1 year:
1,600 kWh
(Export: 1,500kWh)
Demand at Peak: 3.7kW

Question:
**Which house drives
the largest grid costs?**

Energy Drawn from
the grid in 1 year:
3,100 kWh
(Export: 0kWh)
Demand at Peak: 3.7kW

What drives network cost?




Simultaneous generation output:
Max : 12 MW
Min : 2MW

Existing Demand range:
2MW - 9MW



What drives network cost?

Maximum
demand /
minimum
generation




Capacity of transformer:
2 x 10MVA*


Simultaneous generation
output:
Max : 12 MW
Min : 2MW

Existing Demand range:
2MW - 9MW

What drives network cost?



Minimum demand / peak generation



Simultaneous generation output:
Max : 12 MW
Min : 2MW

Existing Demand range:
2MW - 9MW



What drives network cost?


*peak generation
constraint*

N-1 security firm capacity : 12
MW


Capacity of transformer:
2 x 10MVA*

Possible new demand:
*Reduces the need for network
upgrades*

Possible new generation:
*Increase the need for network
upgrades*



Cost reflectivity and cost Recovery




“Fixed Pot”



“Flexible”



“Expands to fill the gap”



<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accordion>
<https://www.flickr.com/photos/denverjeffrey/1950409800>

Connection Charges vs Use of System Charges

Transmission

Connection charges are **shallow**

Only pay for your own assets up front

The rest is paid for through TNUoS year-by-year

But

For local part of the transmission network – you still pay for the upgrade

Distribution

Connection charges are **deeper**

Sometime called 'shallow-ish'

Pay for 'sole use assets'

And contribute to extension assets up to 1 voltage level above your point of connection

Decisions and trade offs

All network
charges on Gen
Charging for use



All network
charges on Dem
Charging for
option to use

High granularity
by time



*Fairness and social
welfare?*



Flat charges
across time

High granularity
by location



Flat charges
across the system

Charges per kW



Charges per kWh

Cost Reflective



Socialised

The Cast




(From a generators perspective)

Charges

Paid by:	
Pays for:	
Components of charge:	
Charged on:	
Cost reflective:	
Cost recovery:	


Generation TNUoS

Paid by:	Transmission connected generators
Pays for:	All transmission related costs
Components of charge:	Peak demand charge Year round charge Residual 'charge'
Charged on:	Peak demand = Transmission Entry Capacity (TEC) Year Round Charge = mix between TEC and Roughly proportional to 'kWh' charge Residual = TEC
Cost reflective:	Peak demand and year round designed to reflect contribution of user to network flows.
Cost recovery:	Residual supports cost recovery, but now wrapped up with other things (e.g. EU limit on network charges to generators) so about to go negative



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
Small Generator Discount

Reduction for 132kV connected generators less than 100 MW capacity in Scotland.

Paid for by flat additional charge on demand TNUoS


Inverse of demand TNUoS

Paid by:	Distribution connected generators via their off-taker
Pays for:	All transmission related costs
Components of charge:	Peak demand charge Year round charge Residual 'charge'
Charged on:	Peak demand = TRIAD output Year Round Charge = TRIAD output Residual = TRIAD output
Cost reflective:	Peak demand and year round designed to reflect contribution of demand to network flows... generators give <i>negative demand</i> so equal and opposite contribution
Cost recovery:	Demand residual designed to recover allowed revenue from demand. Generators give <i>negative demand</i> so are paid the residual – actively works against cost-recovery




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
Balancing Use of System Charges (BSUoS)

Paid by:	All transmission connected generators and suppliers
Pays for:	Costs of balancing the system
Components of charge:	Fixed £ / MWh figure for every half hour.
Charged on:	MWh generated or drawn from the system in that half hour.
Cost reflective:	Attempts to assign balancing costs to the half hour they were incurred
Cost recovery:	But flat charges mean costs socialised across all users in each half hour in proportion to units.



Common Connection Charging Methodology (CCCM)

Paid by:	New connections to the distribution network
Pays for:	Sole use assets and contribution to network reinforcement up to 1 voltage level above the point of connection
Components of charge:	Sole use assets = 100% funded by generator Reinforcement = split between generator and DNO (i.e. passed on through UoS)
Charged on:	Sole use: Cost of equipment and work plus small Reinforcement: minimum acceptable scheme
Cost reflective:	Generator pays what it costs for sole use 1 generator can pay reinforcement contribution that can then be used by others
Cost recovery:	Via DUoS



<https://www.dcusa.co.uk/DCUSA%20Document%20Public%20Version/DCUSA%20Schedule%2022%20v9.2.pdf>

EHV Common Distribution Charging Methodology (EDCM)

Paid by:	All EHV connected customers (in Scotland connections at 33kV and to the 11kV bus bar of a primary substation)
Pays for:	Forward looking costs associated with the EHV distribution network
Components of charge:	Fixed charge per day Fixed charge per kw (kVA) Winter week day peak 'super-red' per kWh credit
Charged on:	Fixed Charge per day: Site specific analysis of impact on distribution network Super-red credits to non-intermittent generators when capable of supporting network at peak
Cost reflective:	In theory "highly": site specific analysis used to identify contribution of each individual customer to future network requirements
Cost recovery:	Residual charges fully recovered from demand-only customers


Some estimates of DUoS costs for EHV connected wind farms in Scotland derived from publicly available information




Common Distribution Charging Methodology (CDCM)

Paid by:	All LV (400v) and HV (6.6, 11kV) connected customers
Pays for:	Forward looking costs associated with the whole distribution network
Components of charge:	Intermittent: flat rate kWh 'credit' Non-intermittent: Banded rate kWh 'credit' Small fixed charge per meter for HV
Charged on:	Almost entirely kWh output – always a credit
Cost reflective:	Assumption that DG reduces need for network upgrade... credit rewards this Averaged over whole Distribution Area Generators Charged (or credited) based on impact <i>at their own voltage level and above only</i>
Cost recovery:	Residual charges fully recovered from demand-only customers

HV connected Wind (CF = 40%)




LV connected Solar (CF = 10%)



Embedded Benefits

Elements of charging
that can lead to
Embedded benefits:

- TNUoS
- BSUoS
- Losses




Question: what is the difference in impact on the transmission network of the D connected wind farm compared with the T connected wind farm?

Answer: *only one thing ... different flows on the transformers!*

Embedded Benefits: Example: TNUoS

Transmission Generation TNUoS

NG Levies generation TNUoS




Supplier wraps all costs up into tariffs for demand customers including TNUoS contribution



TNUoS for distributed Generation

NG Levies demand TNUoS




Supplier acts as off-taker for Distributed Generator




DG agrees PPA rate with supplier which included benefit from reduction of suppliers TNUoS benefit

Embedded Benefits: Illustration of why



Generation TNUoS

Demand TNUoS



The Future




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energynetworks
association

Open Networks Project
Charging Issues

14 August 2017
Energy Networks Association
Document Ref: ON-NESA-P1 Charging Issues-170616
Restriction: None

Energy Networks Association
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HM Government

ofgem
Making a positive difference
to energy consumers

Upgrading Our
Energy System
Smart Systems
and Flexibility Plan
July 2017

Building our
Industrial Strategy



Distribution Charging Methodology Review – Stage Two
Report

July 2017



ofgem
Making a positive difference
to energy consumers

Dear Colleagues,

Targeted Charging Review - Significant Code Review Research Statement

Overview

This letter touches the Targeted Charging Review (TCR) Significant Code Review (SCR).

The main objectives of this SCR are to:


- consider reform of residual charging for transmission and distribution, for both generation and demand, to ensure it meets the interests of consumers, both now and in future; and
- keep the other 'embedded benefits'¹ that may be disturbing investment or dispatch decisions under review.

We are launching our SCR to address our concern that the current framework for residual charging may result in inefficient use of the network. This may drive action from some network users that result in higher reliance on other network users, and hence constraints in general. As a result of changes in technology and other factors, some network users are increasingly able to adjust the timing and volume of their production and/or consumption of electricity, reducing their exposure to charges. Therefore current residual charges will increasingly fall on those network users who are not able to do this. Those who are less able to do so will be able to adjust their consumption or are likely to receive residential and small business consumers in general and more sustainable consumers in particular.

In considering changes to network charges, we are required to have regard to the objectives of the relevant charging codes, which govern network charges, and to our statutory duties. These requirements will set the framework for any decisions we make. We will take a principles based approach to our assessment of alternative approaches to residual charges. We will complement this with quantitative analysis of the likely impact of specific options.

This document does not set out specific proposals to change the other 'embedded benefits' currently available to smaller (and non-embedded) generation (SEG) which is connected to the distribution system. However, we will keep these under review during the SCR. If evidence emerges that these may be leading to significant distortions and consumer dissatisfaction, we will consider whether action, ahead of the completion of the SCR, would be in consumers' interests.

¹ This includes the embedded benefits remaining following our decision on CMP265.



Stage 06: Final CUSC Modification Report

Connection and Use of System Code (CUSC)

CMP264: Embedded Generation Triad Avoidance Standstill and
CMP265: Gross charging of TNUoS for HH demand where Embedded Generation is in the Capacity Market

CMP269: Potential consequential changes to the CUSC as a result of CMP264 and
CMP270: Potential consequential changes to the CUSC as a result of CMP265

What stage is the document at?

01	Initial Review
02	Review
03	Review
04	Review
05	Review
06	Final Report

CMP264 aims to change the Transport and Tariff Model and billing arrangements to remove the rolling of output from those New Embedded Generators who export on to the system, when determining liability for locational and wider HH demand TNUoS charges.

CMP265 aims to change the Transport and Tariff Model and billing arrangements to remove the rolling of output from those embedded generators who are in the Capacity Market who export on to the system, when determining liability for the residual HH demand TNUoS charges.

CMP269 aims to amend Section 11 of the CUSC to align any changes introduced under CMP264.

CMP270 aims to amend Section 11 of the CUSC to align any changes introduced under CMP265.

Published on: 28 November 2016

High Impact: Suppliers and embedded generators



The Future



Smart Consumer



*Flexibility
(Storage, Generator,
Demand)*




Smart Meters




*Shrewd
~~Dumb~~
Tariffs*

- Canny network customers will respond to whatever incentives exist
- Incentives based on assumptions of dumb consumers will drive bad behaviour
- Need tariffs that really do reward what the 'system' needs


Conclusion: Cost reflective? Fair? Annual Use of System charges for a wind farm...



Variation by region of GB for transmission connection



Variation by voltage level in S Scotland



Thanks!



[*Simon.gill@strath.ac.uk*](mailto:Simon.gill@strath.ac.uk)



[*www.strath.ac.uk/staff/gillsimondr/*](http://www.strath.ac.uk/staff/gillsimondr/)



[*www.linkedin.com/in/simon-gill-energy/*](http://www.linkedin.com/in/simon-gill-energy/)



Q & A





Transmission Network Charging





Rob Marshall
National Grid





Transmission Network Charging

Rob Marshall




Transmission Network Charging

- Who are transmission networks?
- How do transmission charges work?
- How do transmission charges change?
- What is changing right now?
- How do I keep up to date with changes?

GB Electricity Transmission

nationalgrid





Transmission Owner

Transmission Use of System Charge (TNUoS)


£2.7bn

- Recovers the cost of all shared assets
- Tariffs include locational and non-locational elements
- Tariffs are set annually, in advance
- Charges split between G(16.7%) D(83.3%) – 2016/17
- Generation tariffs are capped by a c2.50/MWh limit set by the EU
- Generations charges are charged against transmission entry capacity (TEC)
- Demand charges charged based on usage:
 - HH – Triad demand
 - NHH – Annual usage between 16:00 & 19:00

Connection Charges

£210m

- Recovers the cost of single user assets
- Charges are set directly from the cost of single user assets built for customers' connections



nationalgrid

System Operator

Balancing Services

~£1bn

Use of System Charge (BSUoS)

- Recovers the cost of operating the system
- Tariffs are non-locational
- Charges are split between G(50%) D(50%)
- Tariffs are calculated and invoiced ex post
- Charges are based on MWh usage in each half hourly period


Locational TNUoS Tariffs

Generation Charges (Wider)

Zone 4:
Skye and
Lochalsh
£11.19 /kW

Zone 14:
North
Lancashire
& The Lakes
£5.05 /kW

Zone 27:
West
Devon and
Cornwall
-£3.69 /kW



Zone 1:
North
Scotland
£16.29 /kW

Zone 13:
North East
England
£2.90 /kW

Zone 23:
Central
London
-£5.97 /kW

Demand Charges

Final TNUoS
tariffs for 2016/17


Zone 1:
Northern
Scotland
HH: £40.97 /kW
NHH: 5.77 p/kWh

Zone 9:
Eastern
HH: £46.54 /kW
NHH: 6.35 p/kWh


Zone 12:
London
HH: £51.87 /kW
NHH: 6.51 p/kWh

Zone 4:
North West
HH: £42.83 /kW
NHH: 5.69 p/kWh

Zone 14:
South Western
HH: £48.58 /kW
NHH: 6.88 p/kWh




The Residual



Final TNUoS
tariffs for 2016/17

- ◆ **The generation and demand residual** adjusts the wider charges to collect the remaining revenue not collected from **locational charges**
 - ◆ For Generation: this is very low due to the high level of locational element and a €2.50/MWh cap
 - ◆ For Demand: this is very high due to the low revenue recovery of the locational element

A changing system



+ >10 GW Solar




- 15 GW Fossil Fuel



+ 10 GW Wind




Coal free day



CUSC Mods are assessed against the applicable CUSC objectives

- Facilitates competition
- Cost reflective
- Complies with transmission license
- Complies with the Electricity Regulation
- Promotes efficiency in implementation

CMP 264/265




- Demand residual has increased significantly in recent years
 - Growth in revenue recovery
 - €2.50/MWh cap on generation TNUoS charges
 - Reducing demand base
- In May16 Scottish Power and EDF raised CMP 264&265
 - They looked to remove the demand residual for embedded generators
- The mods reported to Ofgem in November 2016
- Ofgem approved ‘WACM 4’ in June 2017

CMP 264/265 WACM4

Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modification 4

- Uses the locational element of the demand tariff as its basis
- Adds the value of avoiding reinforcement at GSP
 - Last estimated by National Grid as £1.62/kW in 2013/14 prices
- Floors any negative values at £0/kW

WACM4 embedded export tariffs 2018-19



Targeted Charging Review

In August 2017 Ofgem announced the launch of a **Significant Code Review (SCR)** to deliver the **targeted charging review**.

The SCR will

- Consider residual network charges – both transmission and distribution
- Keep other 'embedded benefits' under review


Timeline

- Q4 2017 Working paper published
- Q2 2018 Minded to decision and draft impact assessment
- Q3 2018 Final decision and final impact assessment
- April 2020 Changes come into effect


The Ofgem logo is displayed in orange lowercase letters within a white rectangular box with an orange border.

SCRs are a tool for
Ofgem to deliver
holistic and
accelerated changes
to industry codes

Scope modules of the targeted charging review



Charging Futures



Sign up for attendance or to be kept up to date <https://www.surveymonkey.co.uk/r/YJT996W>
Alternatively, contact charging.futures@nationalgrid.com

Questions





Q & A





Networking Break





Distribution Network Charging





Paul McGimpsey

Scottish Power Energy Networks





SR Introduction to the Electricity Network: Charging & Regulation CPD Seminar

Paul McGimpsey
Distribution Network Charging
30 August 2017



Distribution Charging Reviews

- DNOs have a requirement under their licences to review the methodologies used for the calculation of DUoS charges on an annual basis and bring forward changes where appropriate.
- In the time since CDCM and EDCM were developed, the industry has undergone significant change, most notably in the increase of DG.
- It is anticipated that change will continue into the future and any changes proposed now should be able to adapt to future developments.
- The EDCM review made several recommendations one of which was the development of a single methodology to replace both CDCM and EDCM.
- The CDCM review has been wide reaching, considered changes to costing models, tariff structures, IDNO arrangements and a single combined methodology.

Distribution Charging Reviews - Initial Conclusions

- Two contrasting costing model options will be developed further. Essential these are flexible enough to take account of the ways in which the energy networks are evolving.
- A review of the tariff structures is necessary. Under review are proposals to recover a greater proportion of costs through fixed charges. Higher fixed charges would provide greater stability in tariffs year-on-year.
- Future products are being considered as part of the costing model impacts. An ancillary services approach has been considered where payment could be made for a variety of services such as DSR, which could defer reinforcement.
- Moving towards a single methodology (combining the CDCM and EDCM) across all voltage levels has significant support from the industry. This has the potential of simplifying the EDCM and making the resultant models more transparent.

The ENA Open Networks Project

1. A major new long-term project that will transform the way that local distribution networks and national transmission networks will operate.
2. It will lay the foundations of a smart energy grid in the UK.
3. It will enable the UK's energy networks to:
 - Address the challenges caused by the continued uptake of distributed generation.
 - Move from traditional role of simply delivering electricity, to one where they are a platform and enabler for a whole range of new smart energy technologies
4. Network operators must meet challenges whilst:
 - Continuing to deliver safe and secure operation of distribution networks.
 - Ensuring efficient and timely access to the network for customer.
 - Providing value for money.

The ENA Open Networks Project

- First Phase to deliver in 2017
- Expect Second Phase in 2018 and then beyond to RIIO ED2/T2 (2023)



Workstreams aligned with 2017 objectives:

1. Develop improved **T-D processes** around connections, planning, shared TSO/DSO services and operation
2. Assess the gaps between the **experience our customers** currently receive and what they would like and identify any further changes to close the gaps within the context of 'level playing field' and common T & D approach
3. Develop a more detailed view of the required **transition from DNO to DSO** including the impacts on existing organisation capability
4. Consider the **charging** requirements of enduring electricity transmission/distribution systems
5. **Communicate** and engage on Open Networks developments

The ENA Open Networks Project

The Charging Workstream

“To consider the charging requirements of an enduring electricity transmission/distribution system, whose purpose is to facilitate a market place between producers and consumers. Consequently, understanding the drivers of cost and benefits in delivering those requirements. The overall aim is to develop the appropriate whole-system price signals for the TSO-DSO transition.”

Short-term – by Summer 2017

1. Identify problems caused for customers through the interaction of current charging arrangements across Transmission and Distribution
2. Capture the root causes of these problems
3. Establish the level of commonality that might be required to resolve identified root causes and deliver project and workstream objectives/goals
4. Develop options to resolve

The above development work is being undertaken whilst reviewing how TSO DSO charging work fits with other industry charging initiatives and in discussion with Ofgem on coordination.

Ofgem Targeted Charging Review / Significant Code Review

Main objectives:

- To consider reform of residual charging for transmission and distribution, for both generation and demand, to ensure it meets the interests of consumers, both now and in future; and
- To keep the other 'embedded benefits' that may be distorting investment or dispatch decisions under review.

Ofgem are launching the SCR to address concerns that the current framework for residual charging may result in inefficient use of the networks.

The scope of the SCR includes:

- Residual charging for transmission and distribution, for both generation and demand; and
- Keeping the other embedded benefits under review.

The scope of the SCR excludes:

- Forward-looking use of system charges;
- Connection charges; and
- Charging arrangements for storage.

Ofgem Targeted Charging Review / Significant Code Review

Process:

Ofgem to direct licensee(s) to raise modification proposal(s). At the end of the SCR phase of the process Ofgem will issue a direction to the relevant licensee(s). The direction may set out high-level principles (with the detail to be developed by industry) or more specific, detailed conclusions to be given effect through code change(s).

Modification(s) to follow standard industry code modification processes.


Timeline:

1. Publish residual charges working paper - **Q4 2017** (calendar year)
2. Publish draft Impact Assessment and minded to decision on any proposed new residual charging arrangements – **Q2 2018**
3. Publish decision and final Impact Assessment on any new residual charging arrangements – **Q3 2018**

Final phase of the TCR to be led by industry through working groups and code panel meetings.

4. Final decision on modifications **early 2019**
5. New arrangements to come into effect from the **2020/2021 charging year**.

Ofgem Targeted Charging Review / Significant Code Review







Sorcha Schnittger
Scottish & Southern Electricity
Networks



What is a Distribution System Operator?



Market models





Open Networks Project

Commercial Principles for Contracted
Flexibility: Promoting Access to Markets for
Distributed Energy Resources

16 August 2017

Energy Networks Association

Document Ref: ON-WS1-P4 Commercial Paper

While the focus of this paper is on maximising the use of flexibility provided by DER, this is in the context of enabling them to participate equally alongside other flexibility and balancing service providers, including conventional and renewable transmission connected assets as well as interconnectors.

Responses are welcomed from all market participants and should be submitted to

Farina.Farrier@energynetworks.org by 17:00 29th

September 2017.

<http://www.energynetworks.org/electricity/futures/open-networks-project/open-networks-project-stakeholder-engagement.html>



Open Networks Project

Commercial Principles for Contracted
Flexibility: Promoting Access to Markets for
Distributed Energy Resources

16 August 2017

Energy Networks Association

Document Ref: ON-WS1-P4 Commercial Paper

DERs can provide services in a way that improves network coordination and reduces system costs.

- Maximise the use of DER assets,
- Deliver access to markets for all parties
- Encourage new business models
- Maximise the benefits of competition and third-party involvement.

<http://www.energynetworks.org/electricity/futures/open-networks-project/open-networks-project-stakeholder-engagement.html>



Open Networks Project

Commercial Principles for Contracted Flexibility: Promoting Access to Markets for Distributed Energy Resources

16 August 2017

Energy Networks Association

Document Ref: ON-WS1-P4 Commercial Paper

1. What models (procurement and operation) should be used to allow DER to offer multiple services to multiple entities such as the NETSO and DSOs?
2. How can DSOs and the NETSO ensure sufficient visibility and controllability of DER output for managing transmission and distribution network constraints?
3. How can we ensure the various routes to market for DER can coexist and compete in a coordinated way?
4. How should DER curtailment for transmission constraints be treated from a commercial perspective? and
5. How might distribution congestion management activities develop alongside the transition from DNO to DSO?

<http://www.energynetworks.org/electricity/futures/open-networks-project/open-networks-project-stakeholder-engagement.html>



Open Networks Project

Commercial Principles for Contracted
Flexibility: Promoting Access to Markets for
Distributed Energy Resources


16 August 2017

Energy Networks Association

Document Ref: ON-WS1-P4 Commercial Paper

- DER able to offer multiple services to multiple market participants
- Simplicity in how multiple revenue streams can be accessed
- Transmission and Distribution coordination to facilitate service provision from DER to the SO/DSO/Suppliers
- DER and/or Aggregators and Suppliers responsible for providing data to enable contractual settlement
- Market based and transparent services procurement
- Cost efficient outcome for the end consumer.

<http://www.energynetworks.org/electricity/futures/open-networks-project/open-networks-project-stakeholder-engagement.html>



- Five models outlined in the paper.
- Model 5 (shown) is currently being trialled through the Power Potential Project.
- DSO procures the service on behalf of the SO.
- All parties dispatched through a central platform.

<http://www.energynetworks.org/electricity/futures/open-networks-project/open-networks-project-stakeholder-engagement.html>



 **Scottish & Southern**
Electricity Networks



Industry Experience





Joseph Dunn
ScottishPower Renewables





Joe Dunn

30 August 2017

**INTRODUCTION TO THE
ELECTRICITY NETWORK:
CHARGING & REGULATION**

**Industry
Experience**


Developing a Windfarm

Grid Optioneering

Beyond Plug and Play

Developing a Windfarm

Developing a Windfarm



Developing a Windfarm (Grid Considerations)



How much is it going to cost?

- Connection Charges (one-off?)
- Use of System Charges (T/D)
- Liabilities and cash flow
- Contestability or ownership

When can I connect?

- Major/ Minor Reinforcement
- Route to Market
- Point of connection
- Transmission or Distribution


What unknowns are there?

- Consenting
- Changes to Charges
- Probability on restrictions
- CUSC Modifications/ UK Policy

Certainty

Grid Optioneering

Grid Optioneering – A Hypothetical Scenario



Grid Optioneering of a sub-50MW Connection

TITLE: 132kV Wood Pole Trident (Existing)


TRANSMISSION CONNECTION




KEY:

-  Existing Network
-  Network Operator
-  Developer (O&M)


X



X



✓




- Local and Wider TNUoS v.high
- Long lead time enabling works
- Relative certainty around connection

Grid Optioneering of a sub-50MW Connection

TITLE: 132kV Wood Pole Trident (Existing + Intertrip)


TRANSMISSION CONNECTION



Grid Optioneering of a sub-50MW Connection

TITLE: 132kV UG Cable (User Choice)


TRANSMISSION CONNECTION



Grid Optioneering of a sub-50MW Connection

TITLE: 33kV OHL (Move POC, part delivery)


TRANSMISSION CONNECTION



Grid Optioneering of a sub-50MW Connection

TITLE: 33kV UG Cable (Move POC, part delivery)

TRANSMISSION CONNECTION



XX

✓✓

✓✓

- Cable increases cost
- Minimal consent (control of delivery)
- S/S still required near 132kV OHL


KEY:


- Existing Network
- Network Operator
- Developer (O&M)


Grid Optioneering of a sub-50MW Connection


TITLE: 33kV OHL (Move Licensee)

DISTRIBUTION CONNECTION









- Massive reduction in UoS Charges
- Reduced consent
- Additional Intertrip, UoS uncertainty


KEY:

- Existing Network
- Network Operator
- Developer (O&M)

Grid Optioneering of a sub-50MW Connection


TITLE: 33kV OHL (Contestable works)


DISTRIBUTION CONNECTION




KEY:

-  Existing Network
-  Network Operator
-  Developer (O&M)








- More control over consent
- Potentially reduce costs
- Add to process

Grid Optioneering of a sub-50MW Connection

TITLE: 33kV UG Cable (Contestable works)

DISTRIBUTION CONNECTION



- Additional cost
- Remove consent risk completely


KEY:

- Existing Network
- Network Operator
- Developer (O&M)

Grid Optioneering of a sub-50MW Connection

TITLE: 33kV UG Cable (User Choice)

DISTRIBUTION CONNECTION




- Remove consent risk completely
- Remove process uncertainty from CW

KEY:


- Existing Network
- Network Operator
- Developer (O&M)

Grid Optioneering of a sub-50MW Connection



Beyond Plug and Play

Beyond Plug and Play




New Technology Renewable Generation
Maximum Active Power Output
BM Participation (Obligatory)
Mandatory Frequency Response
Mandatory Reactive Power
Operational Intertrip (where specified)

- New Renewable Generation was not designed to deliver additional Ancillary Services
- There is no market value or transparency to allow participation beyond the minimum

Beyond Plug and Play: Ancillary Services

Balancing: Secondary to Balancing Mechanism actions National Grid procures Ancillary Services to balance demand and supply and to ensure the security and quality of supply.




Beyond Plug and Play: System Needs and Product Strategy

SNAPS should reform balancing services markets for all technology types to compete on a level playing field


Existing Market

- Too many products all procured in different ways
- Unclear requirements and interactions
- Unclear assessment criteria
- Overlapping markets



Product Strategy Process

- Rationalisation
- Standardisation
- Improvement



Transparent and accessible markets should create a level playing field fit for the current and future mix of generation


Beyond Plug and Play What can we do now?



New Technology Renewable Generation	
Maximum Active Power Output	
BM Participation (non-BM)	NEW MARKETS/ CONTRACTS
Enhanced Frequency Response	NEW MARKETS
Additional Reactive Power	SOFTWARE HARDWARE UPGRADES
Commercial Intertrips	CONTRACTS
Aggregated Embedded Services (RP, BM)	CONTRACTS/ platforms
Synthetic Inertia	SOFTWARE/ STATCOMS
Black Start	Why Not?

- There is no reason that technology cannot be refined and adapt to provide services
- Markets must adapt to provide flexibility and transparency for participation to work

Beyond Plug and Play



Industry Experience

Joe Dunn

Grid & Regulation

SP Renewables

0141 614 1957

Joseph.dunn@scottishpower.com





Ask the Experts





Chair

Dr Simon Gill, University of Strathclyde

Speakers

Rob Marshall, National Grid

Paul McGimpsey, Scottish Power Energy Networks

Sorcha Schnittger, Scottish & Southern Electricity Networks

Joseph Dunn, ScottishPower Renewables

Keith Bell, University of Strathclyde





Q & A





Networking Lunch





SR Introduction to the Electricity Network: Charging & Regulation CPD Seminar

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